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Grand Jury Secrecy: A Grand Jury Witness' Right
to His Own Testimony
Only within the past thirty years have the courts begun to intrude
into the theretofore inviolate secrecy of the grand jury process.' Defendants have been far more successful in obtaining access to grand
jury testimony than have the grand jury witnesses themselves, despite
many similarities in circumstance and the logical inconsistencies that
such differences in treatment display.2 Traditionally, courts cite the
"long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury
proceedings in the federal courts" '3 as a talisman to ward off further
analysis of the validity of grand jury secrecy.4 They have been reluctant to permit access to grand jury testimony except "discreetly and
limitedly."5 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Bast v.
United States,' used this talismanic approach to deny a grand jury witness a transcript of his testimony despite reasonable, even compelling,
justifications for such disclosure as of right.
Plaintiff in Bast had testified voluntarily before a grand jury,
which subsequently returned no indictments. He was not a probable
defendant, nor had he testified under a grant of immunity. 7 Plaintiff
claimed that he was entitled to a copy of his grand jury testimony, offering several justifications for his need. The most compelling reasons
advanced were the necessity of correcting any inadvertent errors in his
testimony and the need to combat rumors he claimed were being circulated that he was a government informer.8
1. This rise roughly coincides with the introduction of Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 6 in 1946.

Comment, Grand Jury Secrecy: Should Witnesses Have Access

to Their Grand Jury Testimony as a Matter of Right?, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 804, 811

n.36 (1973).
2. As will be shown, an analysis of the reasons for grand jury secrecy presents
a far more compelling justification for a witness to obtain a transcript of his own grand
jury testimony than for a defendant to obtain testimony of grand jury witnesses.
3. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958).
4. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States,
360 U.S. 395, 406 (1959): "The Court, while making obeisance to a 'long-established
policy' of secrecy, makes no showing whatever how denial of [defendant's] grand jury
testimony serves any of the purposes justifying secrecy."
5. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
6. 542 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1976). Judge Widener wrote the majority opinion
from which Judge Wyzanski dissented.
7. Id. at 894.
8. Id. Other reasons cited by plaintiff were: (1) he was suing the federal government in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; (2) a transcript would insure accurate disclosure of his testimony; and (3) he might subsequently
be indicted as a result of his appearance before the grand jury.
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The district court denied Bast's motion requesting a copy of his
grand jury testimony and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.'

The court of

appeals based its decision on the principle, set out in United States v.
Proctor & Gamble Co.,'" that release of proceedings of the grand

jury should only be granted upon a showing of some "particularized
need."" The majority in Bast did not find persuasive the argument
that since Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 2 imposes no condition of secrecy on a grand jury witness there is no justification for
nondisclosure. 13 The majority found that there was no evidence of
possible transcript error and that there was no substantiation of Bast's
claim as to the rumors that he was a government informer.1 4
The dissent in Bast noted the factual distinction between this case

and Procter & Gamble, which it felt rendered Procter & Gamble
inapposite as precedent.' 5 Citing the "equities" of allowing disclosure
the dissent felt that plaintiff's voluntary testimony gave him a prima
facie right to a copy of his own testimony, absent a showing by the
government of some compelling need for secrecy.'

An analysis of Bast requires a brief review of the historical development of grand jury secrecy.' 7 Although the grand jury may have
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 897.
356 U.S. 677 (1958).
Id. at 683.
FED. R. CilM. P. 6(e) provides in part:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the
government for the use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror,
attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist
who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occuring before the
grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection
with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the
indictment . . . . No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person
except in accordance with this rule.
13. 542 F.2d at 896.
14. Id. at 896-97.
15. Id. at 898 (Wyzanski, J., dissenting). Judge Wyzanski cited with approval
the reasoning of Judge Frankel in United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.
N.Y. 1968), and Judge Hufstedler in Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir,
1972). Id. at 897.
16. Id. at 898-99. Although not mentioning Rule 6(e) specifically, Judge Wyzanski discussed the illogic of refusing to give plaintiff a copy of his testimony although
he was free to divulge its contents. He also cited the ability to correct mistakes in
the record as another factor militating for disclosure. Id. at 898.
17. See generally Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455 (1965);
Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REv.461 (1959); Comment, Secrecy in
Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal for a New Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e), 38 FORDHAM L. REV.307 (1969); Comment, supra note 1.

1977]

GRAND JURY WITNESS

had its deepest roots in Roman, Scandinavian and Greek criminal law,",
its common law inception occurred in 1166 with the Grand Assize.1

The Grand Assize served more of a prosecutorial, as opposed to in20

vestigatorial, function and its deliberations were open to the public.
In 1368, after the slow decline of the Grand Assize, a new body
arose-le grande inquest-which was charged with lodging all criminal
prosecutions. This body adopted the custom of hearing witnesses in

private. 2 ' Secrecy, however, did not become institutionalized until the
trials of Stephen College22" and the Earl of Shaftesbury 2l at which time
it became a method of preventing influence and control of the grand
jury by the Crown.2 4
The grand jury was brought to America with the same basic premise of secrecy. 20 Eventually, fear of government abuse of the grand
jury process subsided and government prosecutors were permitted to
be present during testimony.26 Governmental influence on the grand
jury has increased and today the prosecutor often directs and controls
the grand jury.
Secrecy is no longer juxtaposed between the grand
jury and the government2 8 but is used, instead, to shield the witnesses 29
from the defendant.
18. Whyte, supra note 17, at 462. See also Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment":
Foul Blow Or FairPlay?, 55 COLOM. L. REv. 1103, 1106 (1955).
19. Calkins, supra note 17, at 456-57.
20. Id. at 456-57. "This was an age when little regard was given to the rights
of private citizens." Id. at 456.
21. Id. at 457.
22. 8 How. St. Tr. 550 (1681). The grand jury demanded to hear evidence of
College's treason against Henry II in private. After considering the matter the grand
jury refused to indict College. G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 28-29 (1906).
23. 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681). This was another case involving treason against
Henry II. After initially being forced to hear the witness' testimony in public the jury
requested and was finally granted the right to hear him in private. The jury refused
to indict based on the evidence heard in private. Calkins, supra note 17, at 457.
24. Calkins, supra note 17, at 458. One article, Tigar & Levy, The Grand Jury
as the New Inquisition, 50 MicH. ST. BJ. 693, 694 (1971), asserts that secrecy was
for the protection of the private individual while Watts, Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog
or Expensive Antique?, 37 N.C.L. REv. 290, 292 (1959), claims that secrecy arose
for the protection of the defendant.
25. Comment, supra note 1, at 806. In the American case of Peter Zenger, 17
How. St. Tr. 675 (1735), closely paralleling those of College and Shaftesbury, an American grand jury used secrecy to protect the accused from political pressure by the governor of New York. Although the grand jury refused to indict Zenger for his newspaper
attacks on the governor, he was finally charged by information. See Kuh, supra note
18, at 1108-09.
26. Calkins, The Fading Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC.
18, 19 (1967).
27. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1, at 807-08.
28. See In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 569 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 369 (9th
Cir. 1971).
29. See Calkins, supranote 26, at 20.
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The majority's opinion in Bast is paradigmatic of the approach that
most courts take in this area.30 The court cited with approval the "historic" justifications for grand jury secrecy and cited precedents that
uphold the sanctity of secrecy, 3 but failed to evaluate the validity of
these reasons in the context presented.

A contextual analysis of grand

jury secrecy reveals that not only are there no justifications for imposing
secrecy in this instance,32 but there are compelling reasons why disclosure should be granted as a matter of right to such a witness.33
The initial question in the analysis of a grand jury witness' right
to a copy of his own testimony3 4 is whether any of the historical justifications for secrecy are viable in this context.35 Modern courts have
generally summarized these historical justifications in five reasons:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in
its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or
their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent
subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before the grand jury and later appear at the trials of those
indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to the commission of
crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated
36

This analysis must be carried out in light of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e), which imposes no bond of secrecy on a grand jury
witness and allows him freely to disclose what has transpired during
his presence as a witness.3 Thus, the witness is allowed to disclose
30. See generally In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas, 370 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.
Fla. 1974); In re Alvarez, 351 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
31. 542 F.2d at 894-95.
32. See text accompanying notes 37-42 infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 73-78 infra.
34. Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) the court has the power to order disclosure.
In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154, 155-57 (D.R.L 1972).
35. This analysis assumes, as was true in Bast, that the grand jury has already
been dismissed. "[Aifter the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly
proper where the ends of justice require it." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
36. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958) (quoting
United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)). These reasons were
first set out in United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D.
Md. 1931).
More recent discussions of these reasons for secrecy tend to combine reason (1)
with (3) as a single policy consideration. See In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 569 (C.D.
Cal.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971). See also 8 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2360,
at 734-35 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
37. See In re Disclosure of Evidence Before October, 1959 Grand Jury, 184 F.
Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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the very information of which he is trying to obtain a transcribed
38
copy.
The grand jury's deliberation and vote are in total secrecy and disclosure of a witness' recorded testimony does not interfere with the
jurors' freedom. 39 Thus the second reason is inapposite. At first
blush, the first and third reasons seem persuasive, but, since the witness
is free to disclose all that he know, the "evil" is in the witness' freedom
to disclose, not in furnishing him with a transcript. The last justification is perhaps the most persuasive, but again the witness' freedom
to disclose his own testimony makes production of a written copy no
more damaging to the grand jury's secrecy. Continued existence of
Rule 6(e) impliedly indicates that the innocent accused has not suffered under this rule of disclosure.
The remaining justification for secrecy is to encourage free disclosure by grand jury witnesses without fear of retaliation. This rationale is also inapplicable when the witness is seeking his own testimony.
If the witness has the right to disclose his own testimony, then
furnishing him with a recorded transcript in no way further violates the
protection that he has essentially waived.
It is important to note that allowing a witness to obtain a recorded
copy of his testimony in no way forces him to divulge the contents of
his testimony. Existing practices that prevent disclosure of the witness'
testimony absent some "compelling necessity"40 are logically consistent
with disclosure to the witness, since the privilege of non-disclosure is
that of the witness himself. 41 Thus the major distinction in Bast is that
the witness is seeking his own testimony, and in light of Rule 6(e)
none of the justifications for secrecy seem valid.42
The majority in Bast cited United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.
for the proposition that grand jury testimony will not be disclosed without a showing of "particularized need. '43 An examination of the factual setting in Procter& Gamble indicates that the pronouncement may
38. It is evident from the fact that Rule 6(e) has been in effect for over 30 years
without substantial change that its policy of allowing a witness the freedom to disclose
his own testimony is sound and that freedom has not undermined the grand jury's effectiveness. See In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 570-71 (C.D. Cal.), alf'd, 448 F.2d 369
(9th Cir. 1971).
39. See Calkins, supra note 26, at 25.
40. See Arlington Glass Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 24 F.R.D. 50, 52 (N.D.
II. 1959).
41. 8 J. WIGMOiE, supra note 36, § 2362, at 736.
42. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 872 n.18 (1966).
43. 542 F.2d at 895 (citing 356 U.S. at 681-82). In 1957, in Jencks v. United
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not be applicable in the Bast situation. 44 Procter & Gamble involved

a defendant in a civil antitrust suit who sought discovery under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 34" of the entire grand jury transcript. The
Court, in denying defendant discovery, relied heavily upon one justification of the rule of secrecy: "To encourage all witnesses to step

forward and testify freely without fear of retaliation.

' 46

In the context

States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), a case dealing with a criminal defendant's right to review
secret FBI reports, the Court announced a broad policy of disclosure. 353 U.S. at
667-72. Because the language was so broad, many commentators interpreted this policy
to include grand jury testimony. Comment, supra note 1, at 812.
The next year the Court, in Procter & Gamble, retreated from this broad policy
and announced the "particularized need" test. See 356 U.S. at 681-82. The formulation
of this test was never clear. Justice Douglas listed examples of situations where particularized need was shown, such as: (1) to impeach a trial witness, (2) to refresh a
trial witness' recollection and (3) to test credibility of a trial witness. Id. at 683. But
the Court failed to announce any specific criteria. Referring to the case at hand the
Court held that no compelling necessity had been shown "for wholesale . . . production
of a grand jury transcript," id. at 684, indicating that perhaps defendant's transgression
was to ask for too broad a discovery. Indeed, it should also be kept in mind that
the defendant was seeking discovery under FED. R. Civ. P. 34, which specifically requires
a showing of "good cause."
44. In the year following the Procter & Gamble decision the Court extended the
"particularized need" test to cover a criminal defendant's attempt to discover a trial
witness' grand jury testimony. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S.
395 (1958), the majority refused to allow disclosure over the strong dissent of four
Justices who felt that the majority had "exaltaed] the principle of secrecy for secrecy's
sake." Id. at 407. The dissenters in PPG were particularly disturbed by the majority's
reliance on Procter & Gamble as precedent, since in PPG defendant was seeking only
a particular portion of the grand jury testimony rather than the whole testimony. They
felt that the purpose of the "particularized need" test was to prevent "fishing expeditions," not to deny defendant this type of legitimate access. See Comment, supra note
1, at 814.
The specific holding in PPG has been changed by statute. The 1970 amendment
to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970) provides in part:
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States
to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified.

(e) The term "statement," as used in subsection (b)

. .

.means-

(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription
thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 provides in part:
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice
to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30(b), the court in
which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving
party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination
permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are in his possession, custody, or control
46. 356 U.S. at 682.
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of Procter & Gamble this protection of the witness by non-disclosure

may be valid.47 Providing a witness with his own testimony, however,
is not inconsistent with this policy.
The court of appeals ignored the most recent examination by the

48
Supreme Court of grand jury secrecy. In Dennis v. United States,

the Court reversed a criminal defendant's conviction and remanded for
a new trial because the trial court had refused defendant's request

seeking disclosure of grand jury testimony of four government
witnesses. 49 The trial court had based its denial on defendant's failure
to show "particularized need."," The majority, finding that defendant
had demonstrated a "particularized need,"'" recognized the long-estab-

lished policy of secrecy but emphasized "the growing realization that
disclosure, rather than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily

promotes the proper administration of criminal justice." 52
The significance of Dennis is that for the first time the Supreme
Court took a pragmatic approach to the scope and intended purpose
of the secrecy doctrine. 53 The implication of Dennis seems to be that
the "particularized need" test of Procter & Gamble is simply a

balancing test, weighing the traditional reasons for secrecy against the
need for disclosure. 4 In fact, the Court seemed to be citing Procter
& Gamble as one in a line of cases in the trend of liberalizing disclosure

of grand jury testimony.

5

Thus, even under the "particularized need"

test, if there is no need for secrecy, the grand jury testimony should
be disclosed. 56
47. In the Procter & Gamble context, where the grand jury testimony of a witness
is being sought by another person (there a defendant) at least reason (4) has some
validity. But see 8 J.WIGMORE, supra note 36, § 2362, at 736.
48. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
49. Id. at 875.
50. Id. at 868.
51. Id. at 872.
52. Id. at 870.
53. Calkins, supra note 26, at 32.
54. One commentator has argued that the factors that the Court in Dennis relied
on as supporting defendant's "particularized need" were so general and confusing as
seemingly to render the test a nullity. See Note, Impeaching the Prosecution Witness:
Access To Grand Jury Testimony, 28 U. Prr. L. REv. 338, 341-42 & n.21 (1966).
See also United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
In criticizing the majority's use of the "particularized need" test, the dissent in
PPG stated: "Grand jury secrecy is, of course, not an end in itself. Grand jury secrecy
is maintained to serve particular ends. But when secrecy will not serve those ends
or when the advantages gained by secrecy are outweighed by a countervailing interest
in disclosure, secrecy may and should be lifted . . . ." 360 U.S. at 403 (Brennan,
J.,dissenting).
55. 384 U.S. at 869-71.
56. "[W]hen once the reasons for a policy to be pursued no longer exist, certainly
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It is clear from recent developments in statutory law that the validity of this policy of liberalizing disclosure has been recognized. 7
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A) provides in part:
"Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph

. . .

recorded testimony of the

defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged."
It is clear from the 1975 amendment to Rule 16, which changed the
Rule's language from "the court may order" to "the government shall
permit," 81 that a defendant's right is not subject to the court's discretion." Disclosure to the defendant of his-grand jury testimony is mandated by the growing recognition of the proper mode of criminal prosecution and by the recognition that providing a defendant with his own
testimony does not violate any of the traditional justifications for grand
jury secrecy. 60
The dissent in Bast argued that it follows a fortiori from Rule
16(a) (1) (A) that a voluntary witness has a right to a copy of his
own grand jury testimony. 6 ' The analogy to 16(a) (1) (A) is convincing especially in light of the previous conclusion that secrecy has no
validity with respect to a witness' own testimony. The dissent felt that,
analogous to a defendant's right under Rule 16(a) (1) (A), a witness
was entitled to a transcript of his testimony as of right, absent a show2
ing by the government of compelling grounds for non-delivery.
Another recent extension of this liberalized disclosure policy is
seen in the 1970 amendment to the Jencks Act.03 This statute, passed
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v. United
the requirement to pursue that policy ends." Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97, 99
(4th Cir. 1908).
57. The majority in Bast saw FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A) as a method by
which plaintiff could obtain his testimony if he was indicted. 542 F.2d at 897. No
analogy was drawn between a criminal defendant's rights under the rule and the rights
of plaintiff in this case.
58. Many courts interpreted the old language as implying that disclosure was discretionary. The change reflects the policy that, not only is a defendant's right to his
own testimony mandatory, but the defendant need not even seek court approval for
disclosure. See 1975 Comm. Note to FED. R. CRiM. P. 16.
59. For a case anticipating the non-discretionary nature of Rule 16(a) (1) (A) dis.
covery see United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
60. See 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 16.05[2], at n.20 (1976). See also
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 871-72 & n.18 (1966).
61. 542 F.2d at 899 (Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
62. Id. "It is not suggested in the case at bar that the government has shown
or could show any extraordinary circumstances militating against disclosure ....
Nor
is it indicated that ... plaintiff would be unwilling to meet his fair share of any expense already incurred or hereafter to be incurred." Id. at 897.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), quoted in note 44 supra.
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States, 4 allows a criminal defendant to discover pretrial statements of
a witness after the witness has testified at trial. 5 The most significant
provision of the amendment broadens the scope of the defendant's discovery to allow a witness' grand jury testimony to be discovered. 6 The
underlying policy is that once a grand jury witness testifies at trial there
is no longer any need for secrecy of his grand jury testimony, and the
possibility of inconsistencies because of perjury or the passing of time
militates for discovery.
This statutory development of liberalized disclosure in favor of the
criminal defendant and the lack of statutory provisions for disclosure
to the grand jury witness is not a rejection of the witness' concomitant
rights to discovery of his own testimony. It is merely a recognition of
the urgent need for expanding the rights of the criminal defendant,
especially in light of the reluctance that the courts have traditionally
7
displayed.1
Implicit in the disclosure policies of Rule 16(a)(1)(A) and the
Jencks Act, as well as in a witness' request for a transcript of his grand
jury testimony, is the assumption that such a transcript exists. Presently,
there is no requirement that testimony before a federal grand jury be
recorded verbatim. 8 Acknowledged to be the "better procedure," 69
it is argued by commentators that recording should be made mandatory. 70 Failure to record circumvents the usefulness of statutory discovery procedures 71 such as Rule 16(a)(1)(A) and the Jencks Act
72
as well as the benefits flowing from disclosure to the witness.
It is perhaps not enough to say that there is merely no valid justification for non-disclosure of a witness' testimony. It is clear, though,
that disclosure aids the criminal process in several ways. Some of
these reasons were expounded in Judge Ferguson's opinion in In re
Russo, 73 a case involving the right of a grand jury witness to condition
64. 353 U.S. 657 (1957)..
65. The pre-1970 Act did not include a witness' grand jury testimony. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398 (1959).
66. See note 44 supra.
67. See Comment, supra note 1, at 816.
68. See 8 J. Mooan, supra note 60, at M6.02[2][d] n.24.
69. United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1971).
70. See 8 J.MooRE, supra note 60, at 6.02[2][d] nn.24 & 24.1. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 821.
71. See the dissent in United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d at 223.
72. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
73. 53 F.R.D. 564 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971).
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his testimony on receiving a transcribed copy afterwards. 7 4 Judge
Ferguson felt that a written transcript would insure that the witness'

attorney was provided with an accurate record of the proceedings.7 5 A
written transcript would also minimize the possibility of the witness'
publicizing false information regarding the grand jury proceedings.'"
Judge Ferguson was especially impressed by the opportunity a written
transcript would give the witness and his attorney to correct errors in

the transcript or inadvertent mistakes in the testimony itself. 77 After
examining the traditional justifications for secrecy, in the light of Rule
6, and finding none of them applicable when a witness seeks his own
testimony, Judge Ferguson held that a witness could obtain a copy
of his testimony upon "show[ing] only that his testimony was recorded
and a transcript could be made.

78

Jurisprudential thought has progressed substantially from Learned
Hand's pronouncement, in United States v. Garsson, that "the accused
74. The case involved the grand jury testimony of Anthony Russo concerning his
connection with the Pentagon Papers episode. Russo was subpoenaed to appear before
the grand jury but refused, claiming a privilege against self-incrimination. At the government's request, the district court granted him immunity, but Russo still refused to
testify. He was then held in contempt and committed to custody.
The litigation in Russo involved Russo's motion to submit to grand jury questioning
if a copy of his testimony were supplied to him. The district court had approved Russo's
motion, but after testifying, he was refused a transcript. Although the question raised
was whether the court had "the power to purge the witness of civil contempt of court
by accepting his promise to testify if he is furnished a transcript of his testimony,"
53 F.R.D. at 566, Judge Ferguson considered the issue of whether a grand jury witness
had any right to a transcript of his testimony and held that he did. Id. at 572.
75. 53 F.R.D. at 571. Disclosure not only assures that errors in transcripts can
be detected but also gives the witness' attorney an opportunity to discover governmental
excesses. See Comment, supra note 1, at 819.
See also Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972), in which the
court held that a grand jury witness could obtain a copy of his testimony in order
to protect him from repetitious questions, unless the government could show "some particularized and substantial reason why this should not be allowed." Id. at 1080.
76. The opposite side of this coin was presented in Bast, where the witness wanted
a copy of the testimony to counter rumors that he was a government informer. See
542 F.2d at 894.
77. 53 F.R.D. at 571. As Judge Ferguson said:
Any attorney who has ever undertaken the laborious process of deposing
witnesses knows how errors and mistakes creep into the reporter's transcript.
Any trial judge who has had to determine motions to correct transcripts knows
that mistakes are made and how vitally important it is that they be corrected
immediately when the testimony is still fresh in the minds of the court, counsel
and witnesses.
Id. at 571-72.
The dissent in Bast also cited correction of errors as a motivation for disclosure,
542 F.2d at 898. This motivation does not require any showing of actual mistake or
even probability of actual mistake.
78. 53 F.R.D. at 572. See also In re Craven, 13 Cium. L. REP. (BNA) 2100
(N.D. Cal. 1973).
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has every advantage." 9 The development of the defendant's rights
to discovery have included substantial rights to examine heretofore
secret grand jury testimony. Unfortunately, concomitant rights of
the grand jury witness have not developed as rapidly. Too often
the courts, in denying the witness a copy of his own grand jury
testimony, refuse to examine the present validity of the "historical"
justifications for grand jury secrecy. Such an examination leads inexorably to the conclusion that these justifications are not viable where
the witness is seeking his own testimony, and that the benefits of disclosure mandate it as of right.
ALAN

A.

HARLEY

Labor Law-Application of Right-To-Work Laws in Multistate
Workforce Situations
Sections 8(a)(3) 1 and 14(b)2 of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act' provide that union 4 -and agency 5 shop agree79. 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970). This section provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any employer(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any
other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making
an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of
employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the
beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement,
whichever is the later ....
2. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970). This section provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or
Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial
Law."
3. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1970)).
4. Section 8(a) (3), passed in 194-7 as a reaction to widespread abuses of closed
shop agreements originally allowed under § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, sec. 8(3), 49 Stat. 452, bans the closed shop in industries
covered by federal labor law, but continues to permit union shops subject to § 14(b).
The union shop requires the employee to join the union within a specified time after
hiring, whereas the closed shop requires union membership as a prerequisite to both
initial and continued employment.
5. It is well settled that § 14(b) applies to the agency shop as well as the union
shop agreement. See Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).

